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Deterrence-based trust in bargaining: Introducing a new
experimental paradigm
Eric van Dijk, Varia Makagonova, Erik W. de Kwaadsteniet and Manon Schutter
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Institute for Psychological Research, Leiden University,
Leiden, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Trust, especially in the initial stages of trust building, is often
assumed to be the result of deterrence-based trust. While
theorising acknowledges its importance, research on deterrence-
based trust has been scarce. To facilitate the investigation of the
concept, we designed new versions of the trust game in which we
studied both trust (Experiment 1) and trustworthiness (Experiment
2). To better model deterrence-based trust we extended a trust
game with an additional phase where trustors could accept or
reject the trustee’s distribution. We varied consequences of the
rejection option as a delta bargaining game, thereby manipulating
the potential for deterrence. The results showed that trustors were
highly responsive to the possibility to reject the trustee’s
distribution. Trustees, however, seemed largely unaffected and
were generally highly trustworthy. Together these findings show
how trust games can meaningfully be extended to assess the
effect of deterrence-based trust in bargaining.
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Trust and vulnerability tend to go hand in hand. The essence of trust is that you willingly
put yourself in a position in which others may take advantage of you. Indeed, it is this
aspect that was central in Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer’s (1998, p. 395) definition
of trust as ‘a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviors of another’.
Trust can be based on positive expectations about the good-will or benevolence of
others (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Positive expectations can, however, also
have a more situational component (see for an elaborate discussion of personal vs. situa-
tional bases of trust e.g. Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015a). Deterrence-based trust can be
defined as the trust people have in others when they believe that for these others the
costs for breaches of trust will outweigh the benefits of untrustworthiness. Related to
this, Lewicki and Bunker (1996) described the notion of calculus-based trust as a
broader concept by acknowledging that trust may not only be based on the presence
of negative consequences of breaches of trust for others (i.e. if they can be punished),
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but also on the positive consequences of trustworthy behaviour (i.e. if they can be
rewarded).
Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992) referred to deterrence-based trust as the most
basic form of trust that is especially relevant in the initial stages of trust building (see also
Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998). The concept of deterrence-
based trust – and its more general form of calculus-based trust – adds a utilitarian under-
pinning to one’s expectations (see Rousseau et al., 1998; Shapiro et al., 1992) that is not
based on some inherent positive evaluation about others, but rather on the consideration
that others will refrain from untrustworthy behaviours to the extent that it is too costly for
them to do so.1 If the trustees’ costs are dependent on the trustor’s behaviour (e.g. if the
trustor is the one who can punish the trustee), a level of interdependence is created that
adds a strategic element to the setting. Lewicki and Polin (2013) deemed this aspect of inter-
dependence of special relevance to bargaining and other settings with repeated interaction.
While these insights all point to the relevance of deterrence-based trust, it should be
acknowledged that this concept has rarely been the subject of systematic research.
That is, insights on the role of deterrence-based or calculus-based trust have often
stayed at the theoretical level. Ten years ago, when reviewing theory and research on
interpersonal trust, Lewicki et al. (2006, p. 992) stated that ‘a number of definitions and
conceptualisations have been proposed, yet efforts to measure trust and its component
elements have not kept pace’. Today, this conclusion still holds; definitely when it
comes to studies on bargaining. The scarce research that has assessed the importance
of these types of trust used questionnaires to tap the concept. For example, in their
study on three-party negotiations, Olekalns, Lau, and Smith (2007) assessed calculus-
based trust with items like ‘This person will know that the benefits of maintaining trust
are higher than the costs of destroying it.’ In a similar vein, Olekalns, Kulik, and Chew
(2014) assessed deterrence-based trust with items like ‘If this person doesn’t do what
he/she is going to say, I can get even.’ While these studies can be considered as an
advancement and very welcome response to Lewicki et al.’s (2006) statement, we now
aim to further advance the research on deterrence-based trust by designing a new para-
digm that allows for behavioural measures of deterrence-based trust.
A behavioural measure of deterrence-based trust
Questionnaires to assess people’s trust, and in this case their deterrence-based trust, basi-
cally see it as an internal state on which respondents are asked to report. While such
assessments are certainly helpful, it should be noted that such reports do have their limit-
ations, and are often only weakly predictive of actual behaviour (see e.g. Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). To address such limitations, research has also developed
behavioural measures of trust. The most prominent example is the behaviour that is
measured in the Trust Game, developed by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), which
since its publication has further stimulated the research on trust. The Trust Game
models the situation in which individuals may obtain higher outcomes if (a) they trust
others, and (b) these others prove themselves trustworthy. It depicts an experimental
setting with two players, who decide one after the other. Player A (the trustor) is usually
endowed with a certain amount of money (e.g. $10) which he/she can keep to him/
herself. However, player A can also decide to let player B (the trustee) distribute the
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money. In that case, this transferred amount is tripled before player B makes the distri-
bution. So, if A would transfer 1 of the $10 to B, B could distribute $3; when allocating
$4, B could distribute $12, etcetera. In its original form, player A could make a continuous
decision and decide to allocate any amount between the 0 and $10 (see for a review on
behaviour in trust games with continuous decisions Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Other ver-
sions have been used as well in which A’s decision, for example, was binary, such that
A could only to decide to allocate nothing (no trust) or all outcomes to B (trust; see for
binary versions of trust games e.g. Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Fetchenhauer &
Dunning, 2009; Kreps, 1990; Malhotra, 2004; Schilke, Reimann, & Cook, 2015).
It is clear that – both in the continuous and the binary version – there is a potential
benefit for both players to let B divide the (then tripled amount of) money, that is, to
trust B. However, the risk is on A because player B may prove him/herself untrustworthy
and take the bulk of money and run, leaving A with little or no money. Trust games
nicely capture the element of (A’s) vulnerability, where it only makes sense for A to
hand the money to B when having positive expectations about B’s willingness to return
the favour (e.g. by returning half of the tripled money). Trust in this game thus captures
‘behavioural trust’, or ‘trust as a choice’ which is often perceived as more telling than
‘trust as an attitude’ (see also Li, 2007, 2012). Note, however, that the typical trust game
as described above also has its limitations in the sense that A has no other option than
to accept B’s distribution (even if B allocates nothing to A). Put differently, B is in a position
where he/she can react to A’s behaviour, but A can never respond to B’s behaviour,
let alone retaliate.
In this sense, the typical trust game is not yet suited to capture deterrence-based trust.
One could thus also claim that while the typical trust game does capture trust and trust-
worthiness, it only captures part of it. In bargaining settings, interdependence generally
has more of a back and forth nature, where you could, for example, reject an offer.
Having an option to turn down B’s allocation would not only add the element of
further bargaining, but provide A with the additional means of being able to make untrust-
worthy behaviour costly. In other words, it would add an element of deterrence-based
trust to the trust game because betrayal of trust may now come at a cost. It is this
aspect of interdependence that we intended to incorporate, and which allows us to test
its separate effect on trust and trustworthiness.
The most direct and straightforward way to incorporate this in a trust game setting is to
simply provide A with the option to reject B’s distribution. In terms of behavioural games,
this means replacing B’s final distribution – that cannot be rejected in the typical trust game
– with a distribution that can be rejected, with costly consequences for the trustee. In the
current study, we did this by replacing it with a bargaining game that is modelled after the
ultimatum bargaining game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In the ultimatum bar-
gaining game, one player makes an offer to the other player who can either accept or reject
it; if the offer is rejected, both players obtain nothing. Added to the trust game setting, this
thus means that if A is not satisfied with B’s distribution of the tripled money, he/she can
still reject the offer in which case neither player receives anything. While this may not be an
attractive prospect for A either, it does provide A with the behavioural option of deterrence;
that is, with a means to incur costs on B.
That such options may work to prevent exploitation has been demonstrated in research
using variants of the ultimatum game, formally described as the ‘delta game’ (Suleiman,
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1996). The delta game is a more general form of the ultimatum game in that upon rejec-
tion, the rejected offer is multiplied by a factor delta (0≤ delta ≤ 1). When delta equals
zero, you indeed have the ultimatum game where rejection of the offer results in zero out-
comes for both players. If delta equals 1, the game turns into a dictator game (e.g. Bolton,
Katok, & Zwick, 1998) where the distribution cannot be changed even if you reject it. An
in-between value, delta = 0.5, means that upon rejection, the offer is reduced by 50%. Gen-
erally, research on the delta game has revealed that offers go up as delta decreases (Hand-
graaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008; Suleiman, 1996). For example, offers are
generally higher if delta = 0 (the traditional ultimatum game) than if delta = 0.5, the main
explanation being that with lower levels of delta, people fear the consequences of making
too low offers. Low deltas thus seem to function as a safeguard against exploitation.
If we combine these insights with the notion of deterrence-based trust, and incorporate
the delta game into the traditional trust game setting, we come to the ‘Extended Trust
Game’ format depicted in Figure 1. The essential change is captured in the grey box.
Whereas in the traditional trust game, after handing the decision to player B, players A
have no other option than to accept B’s distribution, the extended version we designed
here allows for rejection of this distribution. By doing so, the trust game transfers to a
setting that enables us to behaviourally measure deterrence-based trust.
So how would this affect the trust process? How would trust and trustworthiness fare if
we extend player A’s possibilities for reciprocation by providing him/her with the possi-
bility to accept/reject B’s distribution? To answer these questions, a distinction has to
be made between the two parties involved. For player A, it seems plausible to assume
that by adding deterrence-based trust (i.e. with an opportunity to reject B’s distribution),
A will be more likely to behaviourally trust B. The option to reject may increase deterrence-
based trust, and thus increase A’s willingness to let B divide the (tripled) amount, especially
if the consequences of rejection are high for B (cf. Suleiman, 1996).
Figure 1. The extended trust game.
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It is less clear, however, how itwould affect players B. BasedonSuleiman (1996), onemight
expect that the B’s allocation to A will increase when the negative consequences for B of
rejectionarehigh.Note, however, thatprevious researchhas indicated thatplayers B are gen-
erally already quite trustworthy and benevolent; even in the traditional trust game where B
could do whatever he/she pleases. This has, for example, been shown in research by Fetch-
enhauer andDunning (2009, 2010)whonoted that players B areoftenmore trustworthy than
assumed by players A. Several reasons may account for this positive (and unanticipated)
behaviour, in addition to the fact that people are often simply nicer or benevolent than
one would expect. First of all, research on the equal division rule has shown how strong
and pervasive the norm of equality is (e.g. Messick, 1995; Van Dijk, Wit, Wilke, & De Kwaad-
steniet, 2010). In a trust game the social norm to treat A fairly and distribute outcomes
equally is even further strengthened by the reciprocity norm, which prescribes that positive
acts should by reciprocated with positive behaviour (see also Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov,
2006). Taken together, these combined forces may be so strong that they override more
utility-based considerations like a self-interested motivation to benefit oneself at the
expense of others. If so, the introduction of deterrence-based trust may have more impact
on the generally sceptic player A than on the generally trustworthy player B.
Experiment 1: The willingness to trust
In our first study we focused on player A, and thus on the willingness to trust. As in tra-
ditional trust games, the participants made a binary decision by choosing between two
options: They could either decide to distribute monetary outcomes themselves or let
player B decide on the distribution of outcomes, in which case the amount would first
be tripled. Different from the traditional trust game, our participants learned that if they
would decide to let B divide the (tripled) outcomes, they could subsequently either
accept or reject B’s distribution. The consequences were modelled after the delta game
(Suleiman, 1996). All participants were informed that this information was common knowl-
edge, so that B was aware of these features as well. In the delta = 1 condition (resembling
the traditional trust game), participants learned that even if they would reject the distri-
bution, the outcomes would be divided in accordance with B’s distribution. In the delta
= .5 condition, participants learned that should they reject B’s distribution, the outcomes
of both players would be reduced by 50%. In the delta = 0 condition, participants learned
that should they reject B’s distribution, both players would receive zero outcomes. We
reasoned that having an option to reject B’s distribution – and thus to impose costs on
B should the distribution not be to one’s liking – would increase deterrence-based trust.
As a result, our operationalised prediction was that the willingness to let B divide the out-
comes would increase as delta would go down. Thus, compared to the traditional trust
game (delta = 1), the willingness to let B divide the outcomes should be higher in case
of delta = 0.5 and delta = 0.
Method
Design and participants
The participants, 84 students (50 males, 34 females; mean age = 21.25 years; SD = 2.34) at
Leiden University, participated voluntarily. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
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three conditions (delta = 1, .5, 0). No participants were excluded from the analyses.2 The
number of participants was determined based on a strategy to obtain as many participants
in the weeks we could use the research lab. The main dependent measure was the partici-
pants’ willingness to trust.3
Procedure
Participants were invited to the laboratory to participate in a study on decision-making.
Upon arrival, they were placed in separate cubicles, each containing a computer con-
nected to a server. This computer was used to present the information and to register
the dependent measures. At the start of the instructions, the participants were informed
that they were paired with one of the other participants. Members of each dyad would
be referred to as Person A and B. All participants learned that they were assigned the
letter A.
The options were described without any reference to the words ‘trust’ or ‘game’. All par-
ticipants learned that they could distribute chips, each worth 10 cents, and that they could
choose between two options: (1) They could either distribute 20 chips themselves, or (2)
let B distribute 60 chips.4 In the delta = 1 condition, participants learned that if they opted
to let B distribute 60 chips, they could not influence B’s distribution. Participants in the
delta = .5 learned that if they opted to let B distribute 60 chips, they would subsequently
receive B’s distribution, which they could then either accept or reject. In the case of rejec-
tion, the distribution would be reduced by 50%. In the delta = 0 condition, participants
learned that if they would reject B’s distribution, both would receive nothing. Participants
learned that this information was also known to B.
After this explanation, participants made their decision by indicating whether they
wanted to distribute 20 chips themselves or whether they wanted B to distribute 60
chips. Participants who chose option (1) were asked to distribute the 20 chips. Those
who chose option (2) were asked how they would have distributed the 20 chips had
they opted for option (1).
We also asked the participants about their expectations about B’s distribution. Those
who had chosen option (2) were asked how many of the 60 chips they expected B to allo-
cate to them. Those who had chosen option (1) were asked howmany of the 60 chips they
thought B would have allocated to them, had they chosen option (2).
To provide a direct check of our manipulation of delta – meant to influence the
potential consequences should A reject the participants’ distribution – we asked three
questions: ‘How much influence did you have if you would disagree with B’s distri-
bution?’ (1 = not at all, 7 = very much), ‘What would be the consequence for you if
you would disagree with B’s distribution?’ (1 = no consequences; 7 = very serious conse-
quences), and ‘What would be the consequence for B if you would disagree with B’s
distribution?’ (1 = no consequences; 7 = very serious consequences). These questions
were combined to provide a reliable ‘perceived consequences of rejection’ scale (Cron-
bach’s alpha = .80).
Finally, we also checked for understanding of the main features of the setting (i.e.
whether they had been Person A or B, the value of the chips, whether decisions were
anonymous, what the exact consequences of rejection would be).5 After the study
ended, participants were thoroughly debriefed and were paid 3.50 Euros. All participants
agreed to this procedure.
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Results
Manipulation checks
All participants correctly identified their own role (Person A), and that decisions were
anonymous. When asked to indicate the value of the chips (3, 5, or 10 cents), all partici-
pants correctly reported that chips were worth 10 cents. When asked what, should they
decide to let B divide 60 chips, would be the consequences if they were to reject B’s dis-
tribution (1 = no consequences; 2 = the distribution would be reduced by 50%; 3 = we
would both receive zero chips), 81 of the 84 (96%) participants answered this question
correctly.6
A one-way ANOVA on the constructed perceived consequences scale confirmed these
findings by showing a significant effect for condition (F(2,81) = 56.62, p < .001; η2 = .58):
The consequences of rejecting B’s distribution were deemed less serious in the delta = 1
condition (resembling the traditional trust game; M = 2.39) than in the delta = .5 condition
(M = 4.98; SD = 1.14; t(55) =−8.72, p < .001; Cohen’s d = 2.31), and the delta = 0 condition
(M = 5.38; SD = 1.18; t(53) =−9.76, p < .001; Cohen’s d = 2.63). The difference between
the latter two conditions was not significant (t(54) =−1.31, p = .20; Cohen’s d = 0.35).
These results indicate that the participants correctly understood the main character-
istics of the experiment, and that our manipulations were successful, while it is noteworthy
that the participants did not significantly differentiate between perceived consequences
of the delta = 0 and the delta = .5 condition. We return to this observation in the Discussion
of Experiment 1.
Trust decision
The decision to trust or not was significantly affected by our manipulations (χ2(2) = 7.34, p
= .026). Closer inspection revealed that participants in the delta = 1 condition (resembling
the traditional trust game) were significantly less willing to let B divide the chips than
those in the delta = 0.5 (χ2(1) = 4.10, p = .043) and delta = 0 conditions (χ2(1) = 6.03, p
= .014). The number of participants choosing to trust did not differ significantly
between the latter two conditions (χ2(1) = 0.26, p = .61). See Table 1 for the relevant
numbers and percentages.
Perceived vulnerability
Because vulnerability is considered an important element of trust, and because we
reasoned that having the possibility to reject B’s distribution might make one feel less vul-
nerable to exploitation, we asked participants ‘To what extent did you feel that in a situ-
ation like this, Person A is vulnerable when opting to let B distribute the chips?’ (1 =
absolutely not; 7 = absolutely). A one-way ANOVA on the answers to this question
yielded a significant main effect of condition (F(2,81) = 6.49, p = .002; η2 = .14). Further
Table 1. Number of participants deciding to trust vs. not to trust, per condition; Experiment 1.
Delta = 0 Delta = 0.5 Delta = 1
(Traditional Trust game)
Trust 22 (81%) 22 (76%) 14 (50%)
Not trust 5 (19%) 7 (24%) 14 (50%)
Note: Percentages are between brackets.
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testing indicated that participants reported higher levels of vulnerability in the delta = 1
condition (i.e. the condition resembling the traditional trust game; M = 5.46; SD = 1.53)
than in the delta = 0.5 (M = 4.55; SD = 1.96, t(55) = 1.96, p = .055, marginally significant;
Cohen’s d = 0.52) and delta = 0 condition (M = 3.74; SD = 1.81, t(53) = 3.82, p < .001;
Cohen’s d = 1.02) condition. The latter two conditions did not differ significantly (t(54) =
1.61, p = .11; Cohen’s d = 0.42).
Own allocations of the 20 chips
Participants who chose not to trust decided how many of the chips they allocated to
themselves. Those who chose to trust were asked how they would have allocated the
chips had they chosen not to trust. We first of all analysed the number of chips allo-
cated to oneself, while disregarding the trust decision participants had made. A one-
way ANOVA revealed no effect of condition (F(2,81) = 0.44, p = .65; η2 = .01). On
average, participants allocated a bit more than half of the chips to themselves (M =
13.52; SD = 5.12).
We explored whether these allocations differed for those who had not trusted (and thus
made an actual allocation of the 20 chips) and those who had trusted (and thus indicated
how they would have allocated the 20 chips) by adding the trust decision as a post-hoc
factor. The results of this 2(decision: trusted vs. not trusted) × 3(condition) ANOVA
should, of course, be interpreted with caution because on the delta = 0 and delta = .5 con-
ditions only a small minority opted not to trust. The analysis, however, confirmed that allo-
cations were not affected by condition (F(2,78) = 0.38, p = .69; h2p = .01), nor by the trust
decision (F(1,78) = 0.68, p = .41; h2p = .01).
Expectations for B’s distribution of 60 chips
A decision to trust implied that player B would distribute 60 chips. Here, we first analysed
what decision participants expected B would make (i.e. how many chips would B allocate
to A), while disregarding whether or not participants actually chose to trust or not. A one-
way ANOVA on the number of chips participants thought B would allocate to them yielded
a significant effect of condition (F(2,81) = 6.66, p = .002; η2 = .14). Further testing indicated
that participants expected to receive lower outcomes in the delta = 1 condition (M = 16.43;
SD = 8.91), resembling the traditional trust game, than in the delta = 0.5 (M = 21.76; SD =
7.08, t(55) =−2.51, p = .015; Cohen’s d = 0.66) and delta = 0 condition (M = 23.96; SD = 7.78,
t(53) =−3.34, p = .002; Cohen’s d = 0.90) condition. The latter two conditions did not differ
significantly (t(54) =−1,11, p = .27; Cohen’s d = 0.30).
In addition, we explored whether these expected allocations differed for those who had
not trusted and those who had actually trusted B, Again, we caution against over-interpret-
ation of this 2(decision: trusted vs. not trusted) × 3(condition) ANOVA because on the
delta = 0 and delta = .5 conditions only a small minority opted not to trust. The analysis,
however, confirmed that expected allocations were significantly affected by condition
(F(2,78) = 3.57, p = .033; h2p = .084). In addition, we only observed a main effect of
decision, indicating that those who decided to trust (M = 23.41; SD = 7.03) expected B to
allocate more chips to them than those who decided not to trust B (M = 14.62; SD =
8.36, F(1,78) = 14.76, p < .001; h2p = .16).
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Discussion
The results of our first study showed that behavioural trust differed between settings
where trust means handing over all decision power to another, as in the traditional
trust game, and situations that allow for deterrence-based trust. Having the possibility
to reject increased A’s willingness to let B distribute the chips. Cast in more theoretical
terms, it appears that adding a possibility to make untrustworthy behaviour costly (by
including a possibility to lower B’s outcomes by rejecting his/her distribution), can increase
the willingness to act on deterrence-based trust.
In addition, note that those who decided not to trust B did not favour themselves in an
extreme way. On average, they allocated approximately 13 chips to themselves while allo-
cating 7 chips to B. Moreover, those who did not trust did not allocate themselves higher
outcomes than those who trusted said they would have allocated to themselves. The
decision not to trust should therefore not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of competi-
tive or self-interested behaviour.
The study also revealed some other noteworthy findings. We consistently observed
differences between the delta = 1 condition and the conditions where delta was either
0.5 or 0, and found that these latter conditions did not differ significantly. This suggests
a possible fundamental difference between not having (delta = 1) vs. having a possibility
to reject a B’s distribution (delta = 0.5 or 0), which appears to be more important than the
exact magnitude of one’s impact. Put differently, participants in the delta = 0.5 and delta =
0 conditions may have been more willing to trust because they had a say, which may have
offered them a sense of control, rather than by a consideration of by how much exactly
they could reduce the distribution. Simply having a say may be more important than
the objective consequences of the say. We realise, that one could also interpret the
absence of a difference between both conditions as a sign that our manipulation was
not particularly strong. Note, however, that our inductions were in any case very clear
and successful in the sense that all but one participant correctly identified the conse-
quences. In other words, the differing consequences of rejecting a subsequent distribution
with delta = 0 or delta = 0.5 were definitely clear enough to be well noticed and under-
stood. But when it comes to how the consequences were subjectively perceived (in
terms of seriousness of the consequences), participants perceived these differences less
pronounced in the sense that they considered them equally serious.
This also does not mean that participants did not care about or did not consider the
potential consequences of handing over decision power. The finding that those who did
not trust had lower expectations of B does suggest the importance of expected conse-
quences. While the current data do not allow for a discussion of whether other motives
besides high expectations may steer trust, or whether people fully engage in consequential
reasoning (see for that matter e.g. Dunning, Anderson, Schlösser, Ehlebracht, &
Fetchenhauer, 2014; Kugler, Connolly, & Kausel, 2008), the data do seem to allow for the con-
clusion that participants – at least to some extent – acted on their expectations. Then again,
we are also open to the suggestion that the causality may run both ways in the sense that
people may also self-justify their decisions by forming post-hoc expectations. For instance,
those who did not trust may have justified this by saying that they did so because they had
low expectations of B (see for similar reasoning on self-justification of self-interested beha-
viours in other domains of interdependence e.g. Messé & Sivacek, 1979).
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Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that the introduction of a behavioural possibility for deterrence-based
trust increased the willingness to trust. In the absence of this possibility, as the findings on
expectations revealed, people are more sceptical regarding B’s trustworthiness. Whether or
not this may partly reflect self-justifications (see above), it begs the question whether these
expectations are indeed justified. How would Person B distribute the tripled chips after
being trusted? Would the expectations of participants in Experiment 1 become reality? Or
would the actual behaviour of Persons B prove them wrong? To test this, we designed the
second experiment, in which – using the same three conditions as in Experiment 1 – all par-
ticipants were assigned to the position of Person B. All participants learned that Person A had
shown behavioural trust so that they could distribute the tripled amount.
Method
Design and participants
The participants, 156 students (35 males, 121 females; mean age = 21.56 years; SD = 2.71)
at Leiden University, participated voluntarily.7 Participants were randomly assigned to one
of three conditions (delta = 1, .5, 0). No participants were excluded from the analyses.8
Procedure
As in Experiment 1, participants were invited to the laboratory to participate in a study on
decision-making, and placed in separate cubicles, each containing a computer connected
to a server. This computer was used to present the information and to register the depen-
dent measures. At the start of the instructions, the participants were informed that they
were paired with one of the other participants. Members of each dyad would be referred
to as Person A and B, but now participants learned that they were assigned the letter
B. The instructions of the games were identical to Experiment 1, meaning that participants
learned that Person A could choose between two options: (1) They could either distribute
20 chips themselves, or (2) let B (the participant) distribute 60 chips. Participants all learned
that if A would choose for option (2), A could subsequently accept or reject their distri-
bution. In the delta = 1 condition, participants learned that the distribution would stand
even if A would reject. Participants in the delta = .5 condition learned that if A would
reject their distribution, it would be reduced by 50%. In the delta = 0 condition, partici-
pants learned that if A would reject the distribution, both would receive nothing. Partici-
pants learned that this information about the options was also known to A.
After this explanation, participants allegedly had to wait for A’s decision. After some
time (i.e. 46 seconds) participant were informed on their computer screen that A had
chosen for option (2), so that they could now decide on the distribution of 60 chips.
After making their distribution, additional questions were posed. Most directly related
to our reasoning, we asked questions to tap how important it had been for the participant
the avoid rejection of the distribution. We asked participants ‘To what extent did you try to
avoid that A would consider your distribution unacceptable?’ and ‘To what extent were
you concerned with the fact that A could reject your distribution should you allocate
him/her too few chips?’ These questions were combined to form a reliable ‘avoiding rejec-
tion’ scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .73).
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To provide a direct check of our manipulation of delta we asked three questions,
similar to those posed in Experiment 1 (but now from the perspective of player B):
‘How much influence did A have if he/she would disagree with the distribution?’ (1 =
not at all, 7 = very much), ‘What would be the consequence for you if A would disagree
with your distribution?’ (1 = no consequences; 7 = very serious consequences), and ‘What
would be the consequence for A if A would disagree with your distribution?’ (1 = no
consequences; 7 = very serious consequences). These questions were combined to
provide a reliable ‘perceived consequences of rejection’ scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .71).
As in Experiment 1, we also checked for understanding of the main features of the
setting (i.e. whether they had been Person A or B, the value of the chips, whether decisions
were anonymous, what the exact consequences of rejection would be). After these
measures, the study ended. Participants were thoroughly debriefed and were paid 3.50
Euros. All participants agreed to this procedure.
Results
Manipulation checks
Out of the 156, 155 participants (99%) correctly identified their own role (Person B). Out
of the 156, 152 participants (97%) correctly reported that decisions were anonymous.
When asked to indicate the value of the chips (3, 5, or 10 cents), all participants correctly
reported that chips were 10 cents. When asked what would be the consequences
should A reject their distribution (1 = no consequences; 2 = the distribution would be
reduced by 50%; we would both receive zero chips). Among 156 participants, 147
(95%) participants answered this question correctly. A one-way ANOVA for the perceived
consequences scale confirmed these findings by a significant effect for condition
(F(2,155) = 52.65, p < .001; η2 = .41): The consequences should A reject B’s distribution
were deemed less serious in the delta = 1 condition (resembling the traditional
trust game; M = 3.18; SD = 1.42) than in the delta = .5 condition (M = 4.77; SD = 0.87;
t(82.51) =−6.87, p < .001, Glass’s δ = 1.83), which in turn yielded lower ratings than
the delta = 0 condition (M = 5.40; t(103) =−3.33, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.65).
These results indicate that the participants correctly understood the main character-
istics of the experiment, and that our manipulation was successful.
Allocations
A one-way ANOVA on the allocations to Person A revealed no significant effect (F(2, 155) =
1.93, p = .149; η2 = .025). Overall, participants allocated only a little less than half of the 60
chips to Person A (M = 26.96; SD = 7.03). The cell means are depicted in Table 2.
Motivation to prevent making an unacceptable distribution
The idea that having a final say, and thus the possibility to reject unacceptable distri-
butions, may increase A’s willingness to trust presumes that Persons B would indeed be
motivated to take this into account. The allocations reported above suggest no behav-
ioural effects, but it could have influenced the participants’ motivation.9 A one-way
ANOVA on our avoiding rejection scale indeed yielded a significant effect (F(2,155) =
18.43, p < .001; η2 = .19). This motive was reported to be less important in the delta = 1
condition (resembling the traditional trust game; M = 3.10; SD = 1.50) than in the
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delta = .5 condition (M = 4.44; SD = 1.47; t(102) =−4.62, p < .001; Cohen’s d = 0.91) and the
delta = 0 condition (M = 4.88; t(101) =−5.69, p < .001; Cohen’s d = 1.12). These latter two
conditions did not differ significantly (t(103) =−.44, p = .156; Cohen’s d = 0.28).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 are important for several reasons. First of all, the results on B’s
motivation showed that the manipulation of A having vs. not having a say (i.e. whether or
not A could reject their distribution) did affect the participants’motivation behind the dis-
tribution they made. Thus, participants indeed seemed more motivated to prevent rejec-
tion when these consequences were more severe. Interestingly, however, the actual
allocations were not affected by the manipulation. In other words, while affecting the
underlying motive, it did not affect the resulting behaviour itself. What we saw was that
participants made very generous allocations, that came close to offering an equal share
of the 60 chips to A. In those cases where A could reject the distribution, this could be
due to strategic, self-interested, considerations. Note, however, that in the condition
resembling the traditional trust game, participants could easily have allocated the bulk
of the 60 chips to themselves. We did not observe this, and as we saw in Experiment 1,
players A did not anticipate such benevolent behaviour either.
The fact that we did observe a strong effect on the underlying motivations, and the fact
that our manipulation checks indicated that we successfully manipulated the key con-
struct of perceived consequences, indicates that the null effect on allocations cannot be
attributed to a too weak manipulation. Indeed, note that we used exactly the same induc-
tions that so strongly affected players A in Experiment 1; not only their willingness to trust,
but also the expectations they formed regarding B’s behaviour.
General discussion
How does trust work in situations of interdependence, and in particular in settings that
incorporate elements of bargaining? Previous research showed that people are often
too sceptical in that they trust too little (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010), a conclusion
that is substantiated in our current studies. With all reservations regarding comparisons
between experiments, and between different measures (expectations vs. actual behav-
iour), it is interesting to see that – in all conditions, and even by those who showed
trust – the allocations Persons A (participants in Experiment 1) expected to receive from
B were lower than B’s actual allocations (participants in Experiment 2).
To explain this, we feel it is important to once again consider the importance of equal-
ity. As we noted in our introduction, the preference for equality is more than ‘just’ the
result of strategic concern, that may be reinforced when it can be used for reciprocating
a positive act. A strong preference for equality is also not unique to settings such as these,
Table 2. Mean allocations to Person A, per condition; Experiment 2.
Delta = 0 Delta = 0.5 Delta = 1
(Traditional Trust game)
27.83 (5.56) 25.43 (9.24) 27.67 (5.39)
Note: Standard deviations are between brackets.
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however, and one does not necessarily need reciprocity to explain such positive allo-
cations (see e.g. Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015b). To illustrate this further, the willingness to
allocate outcomes equally – even when one does not need to fear other’s reactions –
has previously been documented in research comparing ultimatum and delta bargaining
to dictator game giving (e.g. Handgraaf et al., 2008; see also Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000).
Those findings too suggested equality as a dominant concern. Moreover, the Handgraaf
et al. study revealed that the positive allocations in dictator games, which prevent any
form of reciprocity, are generally not anticipated by recipients. So there too, allocators
have been shown far more likely to distribute outcomes equally than anticipated by
those who lacked a say in its distribution. Handgraaf et al. interpreted these findings of
people behaving more nicely than expected as a manifestation of the more general
phenomenon of ‘egocentric empathy gaps’ (see also Van Boven, Dunning, & Loewenstein,
2000), denoting that people often have difficulties taking the perspective of others.
Indeed, one could say that the participants in Experiment 1 were not very successful in
taking the perspective of their opponent.
The current findings speak to the importance of situational trust (cf. Li, 2007, 2012), and
specifically of deterrence-based trust. The impact seems especially strong when it comes
to the willingness to trust others. Having a say in the final distribution provides people with
a means to deter exploitation which may help them to put their trust in others. Especially
in repeated interactions, like bargaining and negotiation, which allow for mutual recipro-
cation, such situational features may facilitate mutual trust. Extending the traditional trust
game allowed us to investigate this aspect. Future research could also compare our
current one-shot setting to those of iterated games in which participants make multiple
trust decisions. As the literature on repeated trust games has demonstrated, interaction
partners learn from the other’s behaviour, such that people become more willing to
trust after having faced a trustworthy opponent, and less willing after having faced an
untrustworthy opponent (e.g. Van den Bos, Van Dijk, & Crone, 2012; Yu, Saleem, & Gon-
zales, 2014). Our paradigm may allow for a better understanding of how in the first inter-
action phases trust may be enhanced by means of deterrence-based trust. For future
research, it may therefore also be interesting to combine both approaches to see how
introducing the option for deterrence-based trust in the early phases could be an effective
means to affect trust in later stages.
At this point it is relevant to relate our findings to other research on related topics. Most
relevant seems a recent study by Lenton and Mosley (2011) which showed – in a trust
game setting – that having a possibility to insure oneself against non-reciprocation
increased the willingness to trust. Moreover, people were willing to pay for such an insur-
ance. In this context, it would seem plausible to expect such a willingness in our studies as
well. Thus, we could envisage people being prepared to pay for having a final say. Given
that our players B were in fact trustworthy regardless of A’s options, this could ultimately
mean that people would needlessly pay to have a final say.
When interpreting our findings, and assessing the value of generalisations such
as these, one should realise that the outcomes and thus risks involved in the
present study were rather small. One might wonder what would happen if higher out-
comes would be at stake. This is an empirical question that may be a topic for future
research. On the one hand, one might expect more self-interested behaviours from
players B which would then call for a more cautious approach for players A (see also
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Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, & Martinsson, 2005; Malhotra, 2004). On the other hand,
it may be noted that research on ultimatum bargaining revealed how remarkably
similar allocations can be for small and large stakes (e.g. Cameron, 1999; Munier &
Zaharia, 2002; but see Andersen, Ertaç, Gneezy, Hoffman, & List, 2011). We would certainly
welcome such studies which – when making use of our extended trust game paradigm –
could further contribute to the understanding of trust and trustworthiness in situations
of interdependence.
It is also appropriate to address several other features of our paradigm, which could be
viewed as limitations. First of all, it is clear that in our game, we used a binary decision to
trust. As noted before, trust games (including Berg et al.’s [1995] version) often present trus-
tors with continuous decisions. The advantage of using a binary decision – in which players
had to choose between distributing 20 chips themselves or letting B distribute 60 chips,
was that it allowed us to present participants in Experiment 2 with a clear outcome in
which they all had to distribute the same number of chips (60), and that this would then
be exactly the same as the chosen trust option of players A in Experiment 1. If we would
have opted for a continuous setting in Experiment 1, this would imply that we would
see more variation in the allocations made in Experiment 1. Some trustors might only trans-
fer 3 chips (implying that player B could then distribute 9 chips), others 5 (so that player 2
could distribute 15 chips), others 8 (so that players 2 could distribute 24 chips), etcetera.
This would then have the advantage of a more continuous measure for player A’s trust,
but would have provided a more ambiguous setting for our players B. Nevertheless, it
may be interesting for future research on our extended Trust game to allow for such
variation.
As one of the reviewers of this article remarked, one could think of our newly designed
paradigm as a setting in which players A basically have to make a decision on which game
they want to play, and what role they want to have. For example, one could say that in
what we referred to as the traditional trust game setting (delta = 1), players A basically
have to determine whether they (a) want to be the allocator in a 20 chips dictator
game, or (b) the recipient in a 60 chips dictator game. In a similar vein, one could say
that in the delta = 0 condition players A had to decide whether to (a) be an allocator in
a 20 chips dictator game, or (b) a recipient in a 60 chips ultimatum game. One could
then be tempted to ask: Where is the trust in all this? Is, for example the latter choice
still a trust decision? Or is it primarily a strategic decision?
Previous research on behaviour in ultimatum games and delta games has indeed
shown that allocators in these games are strongly affected by strategic concerns, and
less so by fairness concerns. For example, research has shown that allocators in ultimatum
games may distribute the money equally, not necessarily because they care for fairness,
but also for strategic reasons because they fear that low offers will be rejected, leaving
them empty-handed (see e.g. Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1996; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995;
Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). In a similar vein, research on delta games has shown that allo-
cators are strategic in that they respond to the consequences of rejections with lower
offers as delta increases (Handgraaf et al., 2008; Suleiman, 1996).
Does this imply that trust is by definition removed from the setting as soon as you incor-
porate an ultimatum- or delta game in the trust game structure? Our response is that it
does not. First of all, one should realise that bringing a strategic consideration to the
setting does not necessarily eliminate prosocial concerns (see e.g. Van Dijk, De Cremer,
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& Handgraaf, 2004). In addition, one has to acknowledge an important difference between
our current setup and the setup used in isolated ultimatum bargaining studies. All partici-
pants in normal ultimatum or delta games know is that they can make an offer that can be
rejected by their opponent. Importantly, they do not ‘owe’ this possibility to their
opponent. As a result, their behaviour cannot be guided by considerations of trustworthi-
ness because they are not in a position where they were trusted in the first place. In con-
trast, in our delta = 0 and delta = .5 conditions, considerations of trustworthiness can still
play a role because players B who are allowed to distribute 60 chips do know that the only
reason for being allowed to do this is that player A decided to give them this possibility.
This information is crucial and is what brings trust to the setting. Not only for player B (who
may want to prove him/herself trustworthy to A) but also to A who is likely to take this
aspect into account when deciding on whether or not to make him/herself vulnerable
to being a recipient in a 60 chips ultimatum game.
Our secondary data support the notion that trust is not out of the window the moment
you introduce an ultimatum- or delta game structure. In Experiment 1, the data on experi-
enced vulnerability did show that even in the delta = 0.5 and delta = 0 conditions, partici-
pants did report feeling vulnerable. In Experiment 2, the data on B’s self-reported
motivation did reveal that the motivation to avoid rejection was more important in the
delta = 0 conditions than in the delta = 1 conditions but it did not affect their decisions.
Future research may further address this matter. This could, for example, be done by
testing how essential it is for players A – when placing their trust in B – that B realises
that the possibility to distribute 60 chips is only there because A decided to trust him/
her in the first place.
A second issue concerns the use of deception. In our two experiments we studied the
behavioural decisions of players A and B independently in separate experiments. Partici-
pants were led to believe they were coupled with a counterpart, but in Experiment 1 all
participants were informed that they were player A, and in Experiment 2 all participants
learned that they were player B. We opted for this setup because we aimed to provide
an in-depth study of both roles. As a result, we were for example able to assign over 50
participants in each condition of Experiment 2 to a setting whether they all (allegedly)
had been trusted, something we could not have investigated equally well without decep-
tion (after all, then you have to rely on whether or not participants indeed are willing to
trust). The implication was that in the end, payments were not contingent on decisions
(because participants were not actually connected to their counterpart). While such a
research approach is not unusual in the field of psychology, we realise that the use of
deception and noncontingent payment is considered problematic in the fields of exper-
imental economics (see for more elaborate discussions of the differences between fields
e.g. Ariely & Norton, 2007; Croson, 2005; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). For future research,
and further integration of the fields, it seems worthwhile to test our ideas in non-deception
contexts (e.g. by matching players B to real players A) and with contingent rewards. As
Johnson and Mislin’s (2011) meta-analysis suggests, absolute levels of trust may be
affected by such inductions. The current literature does not yet allow for a prediction of
whether these inductions would have a different effect for trust settings that allow vs.
not allow for deterrence-based trust (e.g. whether in our settings it would have a different
impact in the delta = 0 vs. delta = 1 conditions), but this would definitely be an interesting
question to pursue.
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As a final note, we wish to point to yet another interesting avenue for future research. In
a recent study, Brion, Lount, and Doyle (2015) introduced a new issue to the field of trust
research by raising the question of how meta-perceptions about trustworthiness affect
trust development. How trustworthy do others think I am? Being aware of how others
view one’s trustworthiness seems essential to the development of trust. In the current
paper we showed how in a bargaining setting having an option to reject distributions
can influence expectations of trustworthiness without affecting actual trustworthiness.
An interesting next step would then be to see whether meta-perceptions would change
as well: Do people anticipate the effects that options to accept/reject can have on their
perceived (deterrence-based) trustworthiness? Given that accuracy may facilitate the
development and building of trust this may very well prove to be another meaningful con-
tribution to the study and understanding of trust.
Notes
1. Note that in this respect, the setup also slightly differs from Berg et al.’s (1995) study, where a
no-trust decision implies that all money will be retained by Person A. In our setup, A makes an
additional decision on how to distribute these outcomes.
2. See note 1 above.
3. Exclusion of participants who did not correctly answer one of the checks did not change the
findings: All significant effects we report remained significant, and all non-significant effects
remained non-significant.
4. We report the results on the dependent measures that are most central to our reasoning; the
checks on the manipulations, main dependent measures, and main motives. For exploratory
reasons we also collected additional data, for example, on social value orientations and reci-
procity orientation (both taken prior to the experiments) and other data assessed during the
experiment (e.g. assessments of power). These – more remotely related – data are available
upon request. In both studies, the trust decision was the first measure taken in the experiment
(i.e. in Experiment 1, the decision to trust or not; in Experiment 2 the first measure was the
participants’ distribution of the 60 chips).
5. See note 3.
6. See note 4.
7. Prior to running Experiment 2, we also ran the same experimentwith 64participants. The results
of this lower powered study were identical to the findings we now report, lending more confi-
dence in the robustness of our findings. As in Experiment 2we report here, the data showed the
success of our manipulations on then manipulation checks, no effect of our manipulations on
allocations, and an effect on the reported motivation to avoid rejection, with the mean levels
being practically identical. These data are available upon request. The number of participants
for the current Experiment 2 was based on A power analysis (G*Power 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that 159 participants would yield a statistical power of .80
(with an alpha of 0.05 an a medium sized effect, f = .25; see Cohen, 1988).
8. For three participants, the age data were not correctly stored by the computer program, so the
mean age is based on 153 participants. Exclusion of participants who did not correctly answer
one of the manipulations checks did not change the findings: All significant effects we report
remained significant, and all non-significant effects remained non-significant.
9. We observed a small but non-significant positive correlation between both measures
(r = .11, p = .19).
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